Candidate Appearance Cues in Low-Information Elections*

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ABSTRACT: Voters are often faced with the task of choosing among unknown candidates in low information elections. In this paper we test how candidate appearance cues (such as race or ethnicity, gender and attractiveness) can be used by voters by examining a set of elections where candidate photographs were displayed on the ballot. We also test how the use of these cues varies across electoral contexts. We find that attractive and white candidates are more likely to win. We also find that ballot position effects are more prominent when the voter decision task is more complex.

KEYWORDS: heuristics, voting cues, candidate appearance, low information elections

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Introduction

Normative democratic theory requires voters to be informed when choosing between candidates but this expectation runs counter to the empirical research that shows that voters tend to be ill informed about candidate and party positions on issues. Nevertheless, a large body of research has shown that voters can compensate for a lack of information by using cognitive shortcuts in make voting decisions. Cognitive heuristics are commonly used as a bridge between the realities of a grossly uninformed electorate and the demands of normative democratic theory: citizens can make reasonable decisions without being completely informed by relying on cues provided by the party affiliation of the candidate, elite endorsements, candidate viability, incumbency status and the appearance of the candidate. For example, Popkin has argued that the use of such heuristics leads to "low information rationality" (1991, for a contrary view see Bartels 1996, Lau and Redlawsk 2001). These types of shortcuts or heuristics are particularly prominent in low-information elections (McDermott 1997) and when the situation facing voters is complex (Lau and Redlawsk 2001).

While these studies contend that shortcuts enable citizens to make meaningful choices, another body of research demonstrates that these shortcuts can sometimes bias electoral outcomes and voter choice. For example, incumbents (Krebs 1998), male candidates (Smith and Fox 2001), white candidates (Terkildsen 1993, Sigelman et al. 1995) and physically attractive candidates (Sigelman et al. 1987) tend to have greater electoral success. In the absence of other information, voters may resort to cues that lead to stereotyped perceptions of candidates that hinder the electoral success of candidates. Gender and race can both lead to the attribution of stereotypical traits. Male candidates
are perceived as tough, aggressive, self-confident and assertive, while their female counterparts are described as warm, compassionate, people-oriented, gentle, kind, passive, caring and sensitive (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a, 1993b; Leeper 1991; Rosenwasser and Dean 1989). Gender and race are also used as a cue not only to infer issue positions and ideology as well with women and black candidates being seen as more liberal (McDermott 1998).

Studies of candidate appearance cues have largely relied on experiments while the study of gender and racial bias in election outcomes has largely been based on studies in the United States. We address these shortcomings by relying on results from an actual election in the United Kingdom. We focus on the role of candidate appearance as an informational cue for voters in low information elections but also take into account that these demographic cues can bias electoral outcomes. While experimental data can help establish the causal links between voter evaluations and candidate appearance, little is known about the actual influence on election outcomes. Our study also makes two additional contributions. First, experimental studies tend to examine a single cue such as race or gender. In our study we are able to examine several candidate characteristics. Second, we examine how the complexity of the ballot influences the use of these cues.

We investigate these questions using data collected from elections for community partnership boards that are part of the British government’s urban regeneration program – New Deal for Communities (NDC). These NDC partnership board elections, often using innovative electoral arrangements, are low saliency, non-partisan races to elect members to community councils that are responsible for the distribution of funding for community development (Rallings and Thrasher 2002). Voters in these elections were presented with
ballots that contained the names of candidates for these offices along with a photograph of the candidate. These photographs reveal a significant amount of information about the candidate such as attractiveness, gender, race and ethnicity. We focus on these candidate characteristics as voting cues across different types of decision contexts.

**Candidate Appearance Cues**

Two lines of research are particularly important regarding candidate appearance and electoral choices. First, research into the structure of political preferences has demonstrated that, outside of issue positions and party affiliation, candidate evaluations are an important element in voter decision making. In other words, if voters are favorably disposed toward a candidate, they are more likely to vote for him or her. Second, these evaluations act as a running tally of likes, dislikes, issue positions and even stereotyped evaluations of the candidates. Importantly, these evaluations appear to be influenced also by the personal characteristics of candidates (Miller et al. 1986). Traits such as integrity and trustworthiness are central to prototypical conceptions of the ideal politician (Sigel 1966; Hellweg 1979; Kinder et al. 1980; Wayne 1982; Miller et al. 1986; Brown et al. 1988; Trent et al. 1993; Funk 1997).

Perceptions of the personal traits of candidates may be influenced by factors such as a candidate’s experience or how the candidate communicates campaign messages. However, the assignment of these character traits to candidates is also based on non-verbal cues from candidates or appearances. In the literature on candidate stereotypes, there is ample evidence that a candidate’s gender (Huddy and Terkildson 1993a), race (McDermott 1998) and physical attractiveness (Sigelman et al. 1987) can affect
evaluations of a candidate’s issue competencies, ideology, issue positions and electability. Candidate appearance cues are particularly useful to voters because citizens typically make judgments on the basis of appearances in their daily lives. While citizens may not evaluate others on the basis of characteristics such as ideology or party affiliation on a daily basis they may do so in respect of their personal appearance.

In general, physically attractive people are thought to possess more desirable personality traits translating into other advantages. For example, good-looking people earn more over their lifetimes (Hamermesh and Biddle 1994). In the electoral arena, physically attractive candidates may benefit if voters ascribe the attributes of an effective representative and legislator to them (Riggle et al. 1992, Rosenberg et al. 1986, Rosenberg et al. 1991). There is experimental evidence that suggests that physically attractive candidates are advantaged (Sigelman et al. 1987) and that this characteristic matters most for women candidates (Schubert and Curran 2001). However, Sigelman et al. (1990) have shown that hair loss does not bias voters against candidates.

If appearances are important in the political arena, a photograph becomes a crucial means of communicating information that is important in the voter’s decision-making process. A photograph conveys information about the gender, age, ethnicity and physical attractiveness of the candidate. This information, in turn, is used to form judgments about the candidates. In an experimental study of candidate appearance where subjects were simply presented with a photograph of hypothetical candidates, the researchers conclude, “a photograph provides voters with a clear image of the candidate’s character and fitness for office and this, in turn, importantly influences the electoral choices they make” (Rosenberg, et al. 1986, p.119). Indeed, in discussing the
implications of their findings regarding the use of heuristics in voting decisions, Lau and Redlawsk write, “Party labels already are a common part of the ballot for many types of elections; why not a picture of each candidate as well?” (2001, p. 969).

The stereotyped responses candidate demographic characteristics provoke can also lead to biased electoral outcomes. These biases tend to influence candidates of color more so than female candidates. All else being equal (e.g. incumbency status, fundraising, partisanship), female candidates do no worse in terms of the probability of electoral success than male candidates (Darcy, Welch and Clark 1990). The election of black candidates, on the other hand, is directly correlated with the proportion of blacks in the population of the electoral district (see, for example, Lublin and Voss 2000) suggesting that white voters are unwilling to vote for black candidates (Jones and Clemons 1993, Reeves 1997, Terkildsen 1993). Therefore, in the absence of other information, race and or ethnicity may be a powerful negative cue especially for white voters. While this relationship has largely gone untested outside the context of the U.S., we might expect the same prejudice against candidates of color by white voters in other contexts.

**Voting Heuristics and the Decision Context**

In the literature on both candidate appearance effects, the context of the election has been found to be important in conditioning the influence of heuristics. Generally, when more information is available, the use of these types of cues is minimized. For example, gender stereotypes are less prevalent when candidates are running in elections
for higher levels of office (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993b) where more information is available through greater campaign efforts and increased media coverage.

Complex tasks also encourage the use of heuristics; when a choice is easy to make there should be less reliance on cues. The implications of this research are that candidate appearance cues will be less prominent when the cognitive tasks are less demanding. The manner of presenting information (whether static or dynamic) influences the complexity of the task and has been shown to influence political decision-making in experimental settings even more so than an individual’s level of political sophistication (Lau and Redlawsk 2001).

In terms of candidate evaluations, there tends to be a difference between absolute judgments about a single candidate and comparative judgments made across a number of candidates. Riggle and her colleagues (1992, 1997) found that in the absence of other information about a political candidate, those doing the evaluating will rely on stereotypes. However, they also find that when other information is present, reliance on this other information will depend on the complexity of the task. When comparing candidates, a more cognitively demanding task than making an absolute judgment on a single candidate, subjects will rely on appearance and partisan cues rather than information about issues positions (Riggle et al. 1992). Schubert and Curran (2001) also show that physical attractiveness is more often used as a cue when comparisons across candidates are being made rather than a single candidate being evaluated.

The number of alternatives in the choice set has also been shown to influence the use of heuristics (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). It would make sense that deciding between two candidates is easier than deciding between 10, and therefore, shortcuts would be
more likely to be employed when there are more candidates. However, they find that ideology and candidate appearance cues are more prominent when there are greater numbers of candidates. Therefore, both sophisticated (ideology) and unsophisticated (appearance) cues are used if the complexity of the decision task is defined by the number of alternatives.

**Candidate Appearance, Context and Electoral Outcomes**

We build on the previous survey and experimental research, first, by testing how candidate appearance influences outcomes in low information elections using data from real elections, and, second, by examining how the complexity of the ballot may influence the use of heuristics. While we expect candidate appearance cues to be used in these low information elections, because the complexity of the task influences the use of heuristics, we also expect the type of electoral system and the length of the ballot to condition the use of these heuristics and produce differences in which candidates enjoy an advantage. The NDC partnership board elections used varying electoral arrangements, such as the Single Transferable Vote (STV) and Multi-Member Plurality (MMP) systems with varying district magnitudes.\(^1\) We can therefore test the use of candidate appearance heuristics across differing electoral arrangements.

These electoral and ballot characteristics influence the complexity of the task faced by voters. The lengthier the ballot (higher district magnitude) and STV elections increase the complexity of the decision context. Therefore, we expect an increase in the use of candidate appearance cues in these situations where voters must decide across a greater number of unknown candidates and when asked to rank preferences. Voters face
greater cognitive complexity under rules where they must rank preferences for all candidates (STV) rather than choose a number of candidates from a list in multi-member plurality elections (MMP). Cognitively, the task of ranking candidates is more analogous to making comparisons across all candidates while selecting a number of candidates from a list is less cognitively demanding in that it does not require explicit comparisons or rankings. Our expectations can be summarized in by the following hypotheses:

H₁: Candidates with a more favorable appearance (more attractive, men, and white) will be advantaged.

H₂: These advantages will be more prominent when complexity is greater (STV, greater district magnitude).

H₃: However, the racial and ethnic bias in electoral outcomes will be minimized in more diverse districts.

**Data and Methods**

**Ballot Data**

The NCD elections were held in 2001; in all, 20 ballots from NCD districts were used with a total of 212 candidates. Characteristics of the candidates have been coded from the ballots and the election statements of candidates: age, gender, skin tone, race and ethnicity and whether or not the candidate was wearing something covering his or head in the photograph. The NCD elections were held in November of 2001 after the terrorist attacks in the U.S. and Arabs and Muslims may have been subject to discrimination particularly those who could be easily identified. From the ballot we also
code the ballot position of the candidate, the type of electoral system (STV or MMP),
district magnitude and whether or not a gender quota is imposed. We also coded the
quality of the photograph using a three point scale where 0 represents no picture or a
photograph of poor quality and 1 represents a high quality photograph with .5 between
low and high quality. The coding of the photo quality and other candidates traits such as
skin tone was completed by a single coder. Candidate experience is measured based on
evaluating candidate statements that accompanied some of the ballots. A three point scale
was used to assess the prior experience of candidates coded as follows: no prior
experience in elective or community service (0), service on a community board (1) and
previously held elective office (2).

*Rating Candidate Attractiveness*

In order to establish the attractiveness’ of the candidates, we used a web survey
administered to respondents recruited via the YouGOV webpage. The 521 recruited
respondents (all from Great Britain) were asked to evaluate the attractiveness and
personality traits of 10 candidates that were randomly displayed (one candidate per page)
from the total sample of 212 candidates. All 212 candidates were rated for attractiveness
and personality traits on a four point scale by, on average, 25 respondents. Our purpose
was to assess how voters in these elections might have judged the appearance of these
candidates in order to be able to compare the attractiveness of the candidate to their fate
on election day. The photographs were scanned from the ballots and placed on a web
survey. Other than the photograph and the name of the candidate, respondents were given
no other information about the candidate. While some respondents in the pre-test
suggested that it was impossible to rate candidates solely on the basis of looks, our procedure follows that of prior research (Riggle et al. 1992). In order to encourage evaluations of the photographs, respondents were reminded at the beginning of the web survey instrument of the following: *It is important to remember that although people sometimes have very little information about candidates beyond seeing them in a picture, their perceptions of candidates can be surprisingly accurate* (see Riggle et al. 1992, 72).

Respondents were asked to evaluate candidates on the following dimensions: trustworthiness, shares the respondent’s concerns, leadership, qualification, competence, attractiveness, experience, and likability. The question was phrased: “Please tell me how well you believe each of the following descriptions fit this candidate.” Possible responses were very well, somewhat well, not very well or not very well at all. These traits have been measured in previous studies on candidate traits and stereotypes (Hellweg 1979; Huddy and Terkildson 1993a; Riggle et al. 1992) and are averaged across respondents’ ratings of each candidate. In order to create a summary scale of candidate evaluations we create a scale using the eight trait measures (alpha = .95); the eight traits scores are averaged for each candidate and then scaled from 0 to 1. While candidate attractiveness may seem to be the most analogous to measures of candidate “beauty”, all candidate trait ratings are highly correlated and load onto a single dimension in factor analysis. These trait evaluations based on responses to the web survey were then combined with data coded from the actual ballots and the election returns.

In addition to the candidate “attractiveness” cue, we also include other candidate appearance cues in the model. In all models, we have included the characteristics of the candidates (gender, race and presence of headwear) and characteristics of the photograph
itself (no photograph, black and white and quality). Because we noted no substantive difference between the original four categories of race/ethnicity (white, Arab/Muslim, Indian/Pakistani, Afro-Caribbean/African), the scale has been collapsed into two categories (white candidates and candidates of color). The ethnic diversity of the electoral district has also been included by using a dummy variable to indicate electoral districts that are majority non-white population. We have included an interaction term to test the hypothesis that candidates of color will do better in more diverse districts. There is some indication that ballot position is also used as a shortcut in elections (Darcy and McAllister 1990; Miller and Krosnick 1998; Koppel and Steen 2004, Rallings et al. 1998) so we also control for the ballot position of the candidate and district magnitude.

Our main dependent variable is the success of the candidates in the election contest. Because we are comparing outcomes across types of electoral systems, we need a comparable indicator of the election outcome for each candidate. Using the percent of the vote that each candidate received in the election is not workable given that only first preferences in the STV elections were recorded and the subsequent rankings of candidates were not. Therefore, as the outcome variable we use whether or not the candidate was elected. In both the STV and MMP elections this indicates the candidate crossed the necessary threshold of votes to win a seat on the community board.

Results

In Table 1 we show the results of a model that examines the factors contributing to variation in the attractiveness trait ratings of candidates. The results show that several characteristics of the candidates as well as the actual photograph influence the average
attractiveness of the candidates. It is not surprising that one of the strongest effects is whether or not the candidate actually had a photograph on the ballot. Candidates without a photograph receive significantly lower ratings than those candidates with a photograph. Additionally, the quality of the photograph contributes to the attractiveness rating; better quality pictures received more positive evaluations. However, whether or not the photograph was in color does not seem to affect the evaluation.

Some personal characteristics also influence the average ratings of attractiveness. Female candidates were evaluated less positively than male candidates on the personality traits measuring candidate attractiveness. Unexpected and inconsistent with past research on race stereotypes, candidates of color are evaluated more positively compared to white/European candidates. Candidates who have something covering their head were evaluated less positively. We should not however, that some of the negative evaluations of candidates of color are related to the presence of headwear in the photograph. All but one of the candidates wearing something covering their head was a candidate of color. When headwear is dropped from the model, candidates of color are not more highly rated than white candidates.

Table 2 shows how these attractiveness ratings influence electoral outcomes across all types of elections. In addition to the candidate appearance cues, we have also included again the same characteristics that affected trait evaluations related to the photograph, such as the quality of the photo and the presence of headwear, because they may exhibit direct effects on the elections outcomes. The effects of candidate attractiveness are substantial. Candidates that were rated as more attractive by in our web
survey received were significantly more likely to win. Moving from the lowest attractiveness rating (.36) to the highest (.88) in the sample increases the candidate’s probability of winning by 70 percent (see Table 3 for the estimated change in predicted probabilities). These effects are independent of the other candidate characteristics in the model. When the average trait rating is removed from the model, the size of the other significant coefficient, candidate of color, increases minimally and remains statistically significant. No other coefficients change significance.

[Table 2 about here.]

While female candidates were rated lower on the trait scale, they do not appear to be biased at the polling place. Women are not significantly more likely to lose than male candidates. Even when trait ratings are dropped from the model, women are still as likely to win as men. In order to see whether the personality traits were more important for women candidates we tested an interaction between sex of the candidate and the average trait rating; this interaction was not significant and its inclusion did not alter the substantive conclusion that sex of the candidate did not influence the outcome but attractiveness did. On the other hand, candidates higher on the ballot faired significantly better than those lower down on the ballot. Moving from the top of the ballot to the lowest position (22) reduces the changes of winning by over 50 percent (see Table 3).

[Table 3 about here.]

Contrary to the results from the web survey that suggested that candidates of color were rated more favorably than white candidates, candidates of color do less well than white candidates. However, this is dependent on the type of electoral district in which the candidate is standing and must be considered along with the interaction term between the
ethnic diversity of the district and the race/ethnicity of the candidate. The main effects for
candidate of color represent the effects of candidates of color in majority white districts:
candidates of color in majority white districts are almost 50 percent less likely to win
when compared to white candidates in the same districts (see Table 3). These results
suggest that any advantage in trait evaluations that was evident in the web survey is
undone at election time. Contrast this with female candidates who seem to suffer in terms
of poorer trait evaluations but are not directly affected in terms of elections outcomes.
Table 4 gives the probability of winning for white and non-white candidates in majority
white and non-white districts along with the 95% confidence intervals for each estimated
probability. Overall, candidates of color are less likely to win in any type of district. The
significant difference is between candidates of color in any type of district and white
candidates in majority white districts (where there is no overlap between the confidence
intervals). In non-white majority districts there is no significant difference in the
probability of winning between candidates of color and white candidates.

[Table 4 about here.]

The second model in Table 2 estimates the effects of candidate experience relative
to candidate appearance cues. Note that the sample size is reduced as we are only able to
code candidate experience for a subset of candidates (n=108). The results from this model
suggest that candidate experience has little effect on the fate of a candidate. This result
may be due to the fact that voters in these low information elections are not likely to be
exposed to the level of candidate experience either through candidate campaign material
or through media coverage. Even with the reduced sample size, the same candidate and
ballot cues significant in the other models are significant in this model and the size of the
Next we test how the context of the election and the complexity of the voting task influence the relationship between candidate appearance cues and outcomes. We replicate the model in Table 2 but run each model under different electoral conditions. The results are reported in Table 5. To evaluate the substantive effects of our main independent variables we also report predicted probabilities in Table 6. The first two models represent the effects in different electoral systems. Just over half of the candidates stood in MMP districts and the remaining appeared on an STV preference ballot. Our primary expectation is that the appearance cues will be more prevalent in STV elections given that the task of ranking candidates is more complex. The main difference between STV elections and MMP elections is that ballot position significantly influences outcomes in STV elections but not in MMP elections. This result suggests that ballot position is a particularly useful cue when voting involves the more complex task of ranking candidates. On the other hand, the size of the effect for trait evaluations, a more sophisticated cue, is larger under MMP than STV. However, we should not make too much of this as an interaction between STV and the trait ratings was not significant in the full model. Interestingly, while the effects of candidate sex are not significant the sign is reversed in the STV model. In MMP elections women fair better but in STV elections they fair worse.

Table 5 also reports the estimates of the model under different district magnitudes. When voters must choose a greater number of candidates, candidate cues should be more prominent. As with the previous test of electoral system effects, we see
that ballot position effects are the only substantial difference between the two models.

Similar to the outcome with electoral systems, ballot position effects are significant where district magnitude is larger than 6. In this case, there is a sizable difference in the predicted effect of ballot position on winning between smaller and larger district magnitudes (see Table 6). Therefore, we do seem to have some limited evidence that the simpler cue of ballot position is more prominent when the decision context is more complex.

[Table 5 and 6 about here.]

Discussion

It has been argued that cognitive heuristics can help overcome the informational deficit apparent in democracies. By using shortcuts, citizens can reach reasonable voting decisions that reflect preferences and interests. However, recent research has called into question the ability of voting heuristics to replace political sophistication in producing ‘correct’ voting (Lau and Redlawsk 2001). Our research, which examines the effect of candidate characteristics in election outcomes, suggests that heuristics such as candidate attractiveness, race and gender do play a role in electoral outcomes in low information elections. While we do show that these cues help voters make decisions it is less clear whether these are “correct” or reasonable decisions that are in line with a voter’s policy preferences. In other words, our study is limited in that we cannot determine whether voters are making more ‘correct’ decisions on the basis of these cues. We do see, however, the candidate appearance cues outweigh candidate experience suggesting the
possibility that voter decision making in these low information elections is more likely to reflect bias than reasoning from cues.

There is some evidence that the cues or effects present in the election depend on the complexity of the voting task involved. While the actual cognitive processing of cues cannot be determined from the aggregate data, we do see that certain candidate characteristics are better predictors under certain conditions. We have argued that STV elections present a more complex decision task for voters because they must rank their preferences but in these situations, voters do not seem to be responding to candidate cues at all. Larger district magnitude will also present a more complex decision task. In both of these situations ballot position was significantly related to candidate success while under the simpler conditions it was not. Ballot position and choosing the candidates first on the list represent a more easily executed decision rule than evaluating the traits of candidates based on photographs. This simpler heuristic appears to be more readily used when the decision task is more complex.

That electoral outcomes in low information elections may be biased toward attractive, white candidates may offend notions of democracy that suggest that candidates should compete fairly and on the basis of issues not appearance. The conclusions may be particularly troublesome when we see that candidate appearance cues outweigh candidate experience in predicting the success of candidates.
References


In STV elections, voters rank preferred candidates from 1 to \( n \) on a list where \( n \) is the district magnitude. In MMP elections, voters simply choose \( n \) candidates from a list where \( n \) is the district magnitude.

The respondents ranged in age from 18 to 75 and 52 percent were women.

Rosenberg et al. determined that each respondent could evaluate about 10 candidates comfortably (1986, 112). We follow on this recommendation and each respondent rated 10 randomly assigned candidates along a number of dimensions. Each candidate was presented on a separate screen with the traits displayed to the right of the picture.

In a separate analysis, the models presented in the results section were re-estimated using only attractiveness evaluations. The results did not change except that the size of the coefficient for attractiveness on its own was smaller than the summary scale of trait evaluations.

Non-white electoral districts did have higher district magnitudes on average and a larger number of candidates. We have controlled for district magnitude in the models and the addition of the number of candidates to the model was not significant and did not alter the other results. Therefore, we are confident that the relationship between non-white districts and district magnitude does not confound the relationship between candidates of color and electoral outcomes once we have controlled for district magnitude.

No photograph and black and white photograph have been dropped from these models because in the smaller samples these variables perfectly predicted losing in 4 cases.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coef.</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate of color</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headwear</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No photograph</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black and white photograph</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of photograph</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adj. $R^2$</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>212</td>
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</tr>
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***p < .01; **p < .05
Table 2: Effects of Candidate Appearance Cues on Election Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coef.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trait evaluations</td>
<td>6.69  ***</td>
<td>(2.21)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Candidate of color</td>
<td>-1.91  ***</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Headwear</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>(0.62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot position</td>
<td>-0.06  **</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
<td>District magnitude</td>
<td>0.22  ***</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No photograph</td>
<td>-2.86  **</td>
<td>(1.19)</td>
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<td>Black and white photograph</td>
<td>-1.40</td>
<td>(1.72)</td>
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<td>Quality of photograph</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-white district</td>
<td>-1.09</td>
<td>(0.70)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Candidate of color * non-white district</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Candidate experience</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.01  **</td>
<td>(1.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig &amp; Uhler's $R^2$</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>PRE</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>N</td>
<td>212</td>
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***p < .01;  **p < .05;  *p<.10

Table 3: Predicted Effects of Candidate Characteristics on Probability of Winning

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<th>First Differences</th>
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<tr>
<td>Trait evaluations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate of color in majority white district</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot position</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Calculated effect on probability of winning when moving from minimum to maximum value with all other values set at their means.

Table 4: Predicted Effects of Candidate Characteristics on Probability of Winning: Interaction of Race and District Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Probability of Winning</th>
<th>c.i.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Candidate of color in majority white district</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>(.14&lt;-.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate of color in majority non-white district</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>(.19&lt;-.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White candidate in majority white district</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>(.55&lt;-.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White candidate in majority non-white district</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>(.36&lt;-.87)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Calculated probability of winning for each category with all other values set at their means for each type of district.
### Table 5: Candidate Appearance Cues and Electoral Outcomes: Electoral Systems Effect and Length of Ballot

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MMP Coef.</th>
<th>MMP S.E.</th>
<th>STV Coef.</th>
<th>STV S.E.</th>
<th>District Magnitude Coef. (1 thru 6)</th>
<th>District Magnitude Coef. (&gt; 6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trait evaluations</td>
<td>9.60 ***</td>
<td>(3.01)</td>
<td>7.42 *</td>
<td>(3.19)</td>
<td>10.08 *** (3.24)</td>
<td>9.96 *** (3.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate of color</td>
<td>-1.85 ***</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>-1.90 **</td>
<td>(0.96)</td>
<td>-1.49 *** (0.55)</td>
<td>-2.62 ** (1.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headwear</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot position</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>-0.05 **</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.05 * (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District magnitude</td>
<td>0.28 *</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>0.17 *</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of photograph</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>(1.64)</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>2.57 * (1.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-white district</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>-1.86</td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
<td>-1.36</td>
<td>-1.21 (0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate of color * non-white district</td>
<td>-0.20 (1.27)</td>
<td>1.79 (1.38)</td>
<td>1.33 (1.57)</td>
<td>0.97 (1.22)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-6.42 ***</td>
<td>(2.23)</td>
<td>-5.60 **</td>
<td>(2.10)</td>
<td>-6.40 *** (2.44)</td>
<td>-5.67 * (3.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craig &amp; Uhler's $R^2$</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
<td>103</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Calculated effect on probability of winning when moving from minimum to maximum value with all other values set at their means.

### Table 6: Predicted Effects of Candidate Characteristics on Probability of Winning by Electoral System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MMP</th>
<th>STV</th>
<th>DM 1-6</th>
<th>DM &gt; 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trait evaluations</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate of color in majority white district</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.43</td>
<td>-0.36</td>
<td>-0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ballot position</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Calculated effect on probability of winning when moving from minimum to maximum value with all other values set at their means.

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p<.10