

Reforming the Electoral College by Initiative:
Assessing the Relative Importance of Strategic Choice and Proportional Outcomes

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Abstract: In 2004 voters in Colorado decided whether to approve an initiative that would divide the state's nine electoral votes on a proportional basis rather than retain the existing system that awards electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis. If passed the measure would go into effect immediately having the potential to affect the outcome of the presidential election. Using data collected through a pre election survey, this paper examines whether voters acted strategically in deciding whether to approve or reject the measure. As a rival hypothesis, the paper considers whether attitudes about proportionality structured support for the initiative. The results indicate that while the electorate was divided along partisan lines, the differences had less to do with strategic considerations than with more general preferences about equity in electoral outcomes.

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Introduction

The system used to elect U.S. Presidents, the Electoral College, was called into question following the 2000 presidential election, when Al Gore received 500,000 more votes than George W. Bush nationwide, but ultimately lost the election following a lengthy court battle over Florida's electoral votes. Although George W. Bush had failed to win the popular vote, his plurality of 537 votes over Al Gore in Florida netted all of the state's 25 electoral votes giving him a total of 271 electoral votes, two votes more than needed to secure a majority in the Electoral College. In 2004, George W. Bush received a majority of the popular vote but would have lost the election had he had failed to secure a plurality in the state of Ohio. These two cases suggest a potential legitimacy problem for the Electoral College that raise serious questions about the need for reform. Replacing the Electoral College with another system would require a constitutional amendment that most agree would be extremely difficult to pass. Nevertheless, the U.S. Constitution gives states the power to choose the method of selecting presidential electors. Most states employ a winner-take-all system on a statewide basis. However two states, Maine and Nebraska, select their electors on the basis of whether a candidate carries a congressional district. In 2004, an initiative appeared on the ballot in Colorado that proposed dividing the state's nine electoral votes on a proportional basis. In a close election, this would effectively give the loser up to four electoral votes which could change the outcome of a presidential election.

The use of the initiative process to advance electoral reform is a growing trend in the United States. Recent initiatives include efforts to limit legislative terms (various states 1992-1998), reform redistricting (Arizona 2000), provide for election day voter registration (California, Colorado 2002), adopt preferential voting (Alaska 2002), reform the primary system (California 2004, 1996 ,Washington 2004, Colorado 2002) and extend the use of vote

by mail in general elections (Colorado 2002, Oregon 1998). The reliance on popular support to achieve reforms that change the rules of the game raises questions about the ability of voters to reason through complex choices. Critics of direct democracy often raise questions about voters' ability to make informed decisions. The Electoral College, for example, is believed to be poorly understood (Center for Voting and Democracy 2004). Moreover, while most modern democracies have systems that are based on proportional representation, the United States has little experience with such a system. How then, can voters make reasoned decisions on matters that they know little about?

For these reasons, the Colorado initiative provides a unique opportunity to assess whether voters are able to reason about electoral reform. It also provides a case to examine whether strategic considerations play an important role in shaping voter behavior. The measure had the potential of changing the outcome of the presidential election because it included a retroactive clause stating that if passed the change would take effect immediately. Voters, therefore, faced a strategic choice that would be influenced by their expectations of who would benefit from the initiative's passage. For those who preferred a candidate that was not expected to win, the initiative offered the possibility that their candidate would nonetheless receive some electoral votes. Presumed winners, on the other hand, faced the possibility their candidate would lose some electoral votes. Finally, the measure provided disenchanted voters an opportunity to vent their frustration with the political system by changing the rules of the game.

This paper examines how these factors shaped voter's reaction to the measure. Did voters react to the strategic considerations about the partisan implications for changing the rules of the game? Or were they guided more by their general attitudes about the political process?

The Colorado Initiative

The effort to reform Colorado's winner-take-all presidential electoral system was heavily financed by J. Jorge Klor de Alva, a California entrepreneur and former president of the University of Phoenix. It is widely believed that Klor de Alva's group picked Colorado to launch a proportional system largely because it is easier to qualify initiatives in Colorado than elsewhere. To qualify, a group needs to secure five percent of the votes cast for Secretary of State over a period of six months.¹ Presumably, another reason for choosing Colorado is that the state leans toward the Republican Party, with 36 percent registered as Republican and 30 percent registered as Democrat and 32 percent independent. The slight edge means that Democrats would likely benefit from the measure's passage while Republicans would benefit if the measure failed. In a close election, the loser would win four of the state's nine electoral votes. Had the measure been in place for the 2000 Presidential election, Al Gore would have been elected President.

Given its potential to alter the dynamics of the presidential race, many prominent Republicans, including Colorado Governor Bill Owens and U.S. Senate candidate Pete Coors actively opposed the measure. Democratic U.S. Presidential candidate John Kerry remained largely silent on the issue while the Democratic U.S. Senate candidate, Ken Salazaar, who was competing in a close race with Coors, announced his opposition to the measure. During the campaign, the group organized to run the opposition campaign, "Coloradans Against a Really Stupid Idea", aired a television advertisement claiming bipartisan opposition to the initiative, "At last an idea that both Democrats and Republicans can agree on". Several prominent good government groups endorsed the measure, such as the League of Women Voters and Common Cause as well as some Democratic state legislators.

¹ 67,829 signatures were required to qualify Amendment 36 (see National Conference of State Legislators: <http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/SigReqs.htm#sigreq>).

Arguments in favor of the initiative emphasized that proportional representation (PR) would be more fair than the existing winner-take-all system. Under PR, all votes would count which would strengthen political efficacy and improve voter turnout. Proponents were careful to emphasize that support for the measure crossed partisan lines. Opponents, on the other hand, argued that dividing the state's electors would weaken Colorado's influence in presidential elections. As a result, they claimed that future candidates would ignore the state and campaign elsewhere. One of the themes in the campaign was that the backers of the initiative, who were from outside the state, wanted to use the state as a laboratory and weaken its influence in national campaigns. Proponents raised close to \$800,000, almost all which was funded by Klor de Alva while the opposition received over \$600,000 in contributions 30 days prior to the election (Colorado Secretary of State).

In the end, Amendment 36 failed by 65 to 35 percent. In the following section, several theories are outlined that might explain how voters reacted to the proposal.

Hypotheses

One explanation assumes that voters are likely to evaluate proposals to change electoral rules in terms of winning and losing (Anderson et al. 2005). Voters were faced with a strategic choice that had the potential to influence the outcome of the presidential election. The retroactive nature of the measure meant that if it were passed, the measure would go into affect immediately. Like the 2000 presidential election, the 2004 election was expected to be extremely close meaning that Colorado's nine electoral votes may prove to be potentially decisive. In addition, the race in Colorado was closer than expected. In the previous election, George W. Bush had carried the state by about nine percent of the vote and it was therefore considered in relatively safe hands for the Republicans. But in 2004, polls showed that the race was competitive and that John Kerry may be able to achieve an upset. Expectations

about each candidate's prospects, therefore, may have influenced how voters reacted to the proposal. If voters are instrumentally motivated, then they should take into account how passage of the amendment would affect their preferred candidate's prospects of winning. Voters who expected their preferred candidate to carry the state should be expected to vote against the proposal while those who expected their preferred candidate to lose should be expected to vote for the proposal. On the other hand, uncertainty about the presidential candidate's prospects in the state may lead instrumentally motivated voters to support the measure, opting to divide the state's electoral votes rather than risk a loss of all nine votes. Table 1 illustrates how presidential vote choice and expectations interact to influence a choice on the initiative. For example, a Bush supporter who expects Bush to lose the state or is uncertain about Bush's prospects of winning would be expected to vote in favor of the proposal. However if a Bush supporter is certain that Bush will carry the state, then he or she is expected to oppose the proposal.

(Table 1 here)

Such an explanation would appear to require a great deal of sophistication on the part of the voter. Such sophistication, however, is not entirely necessary for voters to behave in a strategic or instrumental way. Theories about opinion formation assume that many voters rely on cues from political elites as a basis for rational decision making (Zaller 1992). Empirical evidence from direct democracy campaigns indicates that voters can be influenced by elites (Karp 1998, Lupia 1994). Because of the potential impact on the presidential race, one can assume that political elites who see a partisan advantage for their candidate will choose to endorse the proposal while those who see a disadvantage will oppose it.

An alternative view that is also consistent with self interested behavior is that voters make retrospective judgments when deciding whether to support a change in the system.

Those who believe that the current arrangements place them at a disadvantage are likely to embrace a change in the status quo while winners are going to resist change. Voters in New Zealand reacted this way to a referendum to change their electoral system from a single member plurality system to proportional representation. Small party supporters as well as the Labour party, both of which had been disadvantaged by the existing system formed the basis of support for the successful referendum while the National party in power opposed it (Banducci and Karp 1998).

Given that PR offers independents and other groups who are marginalized by the winner-take-all system to gain some voice in the process, an explanation based on partisan self-interest would predict that those groups will be more likely to embrace principals of proportionality. On the other hand, those whose preferred candidates typically do well under the existing winner-take-all rules would be expected to oppose the idea of proportionality. Note that while this explanation is based on the assumption of self-interest, it differs from the strategic hypothesis set above. In this scenario, Republicans should be expected to be less supportive of the concept of proportionality and consequently less likely to support the proposal, regardless of their expectations about the U.S. Presidential race.

A third explanation assumes that citizens are motivated less by self-interest and more by their general attitudes toward the political process. Those who have confidence in the process and are generally satisfied should be likely to embrace the status quo and vote against the proposal, regardless of their preferences for the presidential race. In contrast, those expressing dissatisfaction with the current system should be most likely to support a change in the status quo. Ideological concerns are also likely to play a role. To the extent that liberals favor equitable outcomes, we might expect liberals to be more likely to support the concept of proportionality while conservatives will be likely to reject it. Men and women may also have very different views about democratic norms and principals of fairness. Therefore,

rather than concern for partisan self-interest, attitudes about electoral reform are expected to be based on the importance citizens place on fairness and their overall satisfaction with the political process.

Data

The following analysis relies on a pre-election survey data of 474 eligible voters in Colorado. The survey was designed by the author and conducted by computer assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) techniques during the week prior to the election (October 25-November 1). The questionnaire included about 25 questions and took 10-12 minutes to complete. The cooperation rate was 50.4% and 75% agreed to be surveyed again after the election. Those respondents providing email addresses were contacted by email after the election and asked to complete a web survey. The completion rate was about 50 percent. Other respondents were contacted after the election by telephone. Of these, 93% agreed to be interviewed.

To measure candidate preferences, we rely on a question asking respondents their intended vote for president. As a measure of partisanship, we use the standard measure of party identification. To assess expectations about who would win the election, several questions were included asking respondents who they believed would win the national election as well as who would carry the state of Colorado (see Appendix). Responses to these items are listed in Table 2. Reflecting the competitiveness of the race, 40 percent believed that it was too close to call while another 40 percent believed that George W. Bush would be reelected. There was less doubt about the outcome of the race in Colorado. A majority of voters, 58 percent, believed that Bush would carry the state while just 13 percent believed that Kerry would win. In either case, expectations about the outcome of the race were likely to reflect a bit of wishful thinking; Republicans are more likely to be certain of the outcome

and expect a Bush victory whereas Democrats were more likely to believe that Kerry would win the presidential election than Republicans or Independents. In Colorado, Republicans and Independents were more likely to expect a Bush victory than Democrats.

(Table 2)

To assess general attitudes about the political process, we use several items designed to assess general satisfaction as well as measure attitudes about political efficacy. Satisfaction is measured by a question asking whether citizens are generally satisfied with the way democracy works. Political efficacy is measured by whether respondents agree or disagree that their vote counts in elections and whether they have a say. Another item that assesses perceptions of government responsiveness is measured by whether respondents believe that elections makes government pay attention a great deal. Responses to these questions are listed in Table 3. Overall, about three quarters of the electorate were satisfied with the way democracy works, though there is a substantial partisan difference, with more than nine out of ten Republicans expressing satisfaction compared to just two-thirds of Democrats and independents. While close to 90 percent believe their vote counts, far fewer believe that they have a say in the process (71 percent) or that elections makes government pay a good deal of attention (43 percent). Similar partisan differences are evident on these items, with Republicans expressing the most confidence. When asked specifically whether they believed that the 2000 presidential election was fair, the electorate remained evenly divided with 85 of Republicans believing it was fair compared to just 11 percent of Democrats. Thus opinions about fairness of the previous election are almost perfectly collinear with partisanship.

(Table 3 here)

Asking voters to assess the fairness of the 2000 presidential election raises the question of whether citizens even fully understand how the system works. As an initial assessment of knowledge about the Electoral College, respondents were asked, “In

presidential elections, the winner is decided by who wins the popular vote.” Over 70 percent responded correctly that the statement is false while 25 percent believed it was true. Thus the vast majority of voters in Colorado at least appear to understand that the Electoral College is not based on the popular vote nationwide.

To measure support for proportionality, respondents were asked the following question: “Imagine that a presidential candidate receives 20 percent of the vote nationwide but fails to carry a single state. Do you think that candidate should receive 20 percent of the electoral votes or no votes at all?” This question was designed by the New Zealand Election Study (NZES) to measure support for proportionality (see Vowles et al. 2002). The 20 percent threshold was chosen because it provided a realistic example for a recent third party candidacy when Ross Perot received 20 percent of the vote but failed to carry a single state in the 1992 presidential election.

Responses to this item reveal that two-thirds of the electorate support the concept of proportionality at least to some extent. Overall, 29 percent believe that the candidate deserves 20 percent of the electoral votes while 26 percent believe that the candidate should receive at least some of the vote. A third of the electorate, however, believes that a candidate winning 20 percent of the vote but failing to carry a single state deserves nothing.

The Strategic Hypothesis

As a test of the strategic hypothesis, we begin by evaluating how expectations about the outcome of the presidential race may have influenced support for the proposal to change the method of selecting presidential electors. If opinions are guided by strategic self-interest, those who believe their preferred candidate will carry the state should oppose the ballot measure as suggested in Table 1. As seen in Table 4, support among Bush voters expecting a Bush win is quite low, consistent with the strategic hypothesis. Overall less than 20 percent

supported the proposal. Support increases to 32 percent among Bush voters expecting John Kerry to carry the state. Support among Bush voters who are uncertain about the outcome of the race is also somewhat higher than those certain that Bush would win. Support for the proposal is considerably higher among Kerry voters expecting a Bush win. Specifically, about 65 percent support the proposal. Those uncertain about the race are also equally likely to support the proposal. While these results are altogether consistent with the strategic hypothesis, support is also high among Kerry voters expecting a Kerry win, a result that is entirely inconsistent with the theory set above. Indeed, there is very little difference in levels of support among Kerry voters who have very different expectations about the outcome of the presidential race.

(Table 4 here)

The analysis above suggests a strong partisan influence in support for the initiative. Those intending to vote for the Democratic presidential candidate, John Kerry, were likely to support the initiative while those intending to vote for Republican George W. Bush were likely to oppose it. This provides some support for the expectation about partisan self-interest. To evaluate this further consider how the partisans differ in their attitudes about proportionality. While proportionality may be an abstract concept, is it nonetheless evident that partisans have very different views about electoral fairness as Table 5 shows.

Republicans are generally opposed to the idea of proportional outcomes while Democrats and independents are more likely to support it. While this appears to provide support for the self-interest hypothesis, these differences may also result from attitudinal differences about the democratic process. Recall that Republicans for the most part are more satisfied with the political process and are more likely to be efficacious than Democrats or independents. These differences may also result from the fact that Republicans are more used to winning elections than Democrats. To assess whether individuals considered themselves as winners or losers,

and how these perceptions might influence attitudes about proportionality, we replicated a question developed by Bowler and Donovan (2004) that asked respondents to think about whether the candidates that they had supported in presidential elections usually won or usually lost (see Appendix for question wording). As a measure of subjectivity we included the response category, sometimes won or sometimes lost. Those who feel that their candidates usually won are likely to oppose proportionality while those who believe their candidates usually lose are more likely to support fully proportional outcomes. The responses are similar to the partisan distributions. These responses may also result from ideological differences that exist between liberals and conservatives that are shared by Democrats and Republicans respectively. Liberals are more likely to place an emphasis on procedural fairness while conservatives are likely to emphasize stability (Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2004). As Table 5 reveals, the differences between liberals and conservatives on attitudes about proportionality are even larger than the partisan differences.

(Table 5 here)

Proportionality

All of this suggests the need for a multivariate analysis to determine what factors are associated with support for proportional outcomes. So far it has been suggested that the importance that citizens place on democratic fairness can be the result of their overall satisfaction with the political process, their level of political efficacy, and their sense that government is responsive to their concerns. Alternatively, ideological concerns may be more important than pure self-interest.

To test these hypotheses a model is estimated predicting support for proportional outcomes. The model includes the attitudinal measures listed in Table 2 which are intended to measure political efficacy as well as satisfaction with democracy. Partisanship is measured by whether respondents report identifying with one of the two major parties. Ideology is

measured by responses to the following item, “When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as very liberal, liberal, middle of the road, conservative, or very conservative?” We also control for gender differences as well as differences that may result from minority status. Because the dependent variable, proportionality, has three categories, ordered logit is used to estimate the model.

To ease the interpretation of the results, Table 6 presents the estimated probabilities of supporting fully proportional outcomes for each of the significant independent variables at the minimum and maximum values, holding all other variables in the model at their mean values. The full model is reported in the Appendix. The results indicate that ideology emerges as the strongest predictor of support for proportional outcomes while few other variables are statistically significant. Those who consider themselves to be very liberal have a probability of .52 of preferring proportional outcomes, holding all other variables constant at their mean values. In contrast, a person who considers herself to be very conservative has a probability of just .12 of preferring proportional outcomes. In comparison, there are no significant partisan differences. Neither is internal efficacy or dissatisfaction with democracy a significant predictor. However, individuals who feel they have no say in the process are more likely to favor proportional outcomes; specifically those who strongly agree with the statement, “people like me have no say in what government does” have a probability of preferring proportional outcomes of .35 compared to .21 for the person who strongly disagrees with the statement. Women are also significantly more likely to prefer proportional outcomes than men. Similarly, minorities are more likely to favor proportional outcomes than whites.

These results indicate that ideological values rather than partisan self interest structure general attitudes about concepts of proportionality. Similar ideological differences have been found among mass publics in New Zealand (Vowles et al. 1998) and among elites in

Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand (Bowler, Donovan and Karp 2004). The observed gender differences are also consistent with research on distributive justice which shows that women place more importance on equality while men are likely to emphasize efficiency (Scott et al. 2001).

(Table 6 here)

Explaining the Vote

To estimate the impact of attitudes about proportionality on the vote, a two stage model is used where proportionality is estimated with the predicted values from the model described above. It is assumed that party identification has a direct influence on the vote choice so it is also included as a control variable. Additional variables include age, education, gender, and minority status (see Appendix for details).

As Figure 1 reveals, proportionality has a strong impact on the vote. Those who believe that a candidate receiving 20 percent of the vote deserves nothing if the candidate cannot also carry a state has less than a .20 probability of supporting the initiative. In contrast, a person who believes in fully proportional outcomes has a .66 probability of supporting the initiative. Persons who believe in some element of proportionality are more than twice as likely to vote for the initiative than those who believe that a candidate must have a plurality to receive electoral votes. These results strongly suggest that voters were influenced by values. Nevertheless, even when controlling for proportionality, partisan differences emerge, with Republicans being significantly less likely than independents to support the measure.

(Figure 1 here)

These partisan differences raise the question of whether voters were influenced by what they heard from elites. Despite the partisan nature of the measure, most voters were somewhat ambivalent about the elite position. When asked, “Do you happen to know whether

leaders in the Republican party have endorsed or opposed Amendment 36?" more than half responded that they did not know. A similar percentage reported not knowing whether leaders in the Democratic party had taken a position on the measure. Of those who believed that leaders of the parties took a position, most were correct in assuming that the Republicans were opposed while there was more ambivalence about the Democratic position.

To estimate whether knowledge of partisan opposition influenced the vote, another model is estimated that includes a measure of whether citizens were aware that party elites were opposed to the measure. Another term representing an interaction between party identification and awareness is included in the model following the assumption that such knowledge depends on whether a citizen identifies with the party of the elite. As before, proportionality is measured by predicted values from the earlier model. Awareness of the elite opposition significantly lowers the probability of voting for the initiative. As Figure 2 shows, Republicans who are aware have a probability of about 6 percent of supporting the initiative, compared to .25 for Republicans who are not aware of Republican opposition. A similar effect is evident for Democrats but the difference is not as great.

(Figure 2 here)

Discussion

These results have implications not only for the prospects of future reform but also for the initiative process itself. While the measure was soundly defeated, there nevertheless appears to be strong support for reform. When asked after the election whether the system needs to be reformed, a majority of 55 percent agreed with the need for reform. Moreover, while Americans have no experience with a proportional system, most citizens in Colorado believe that an electoral system should guarantee at least in some degree of proportionality. Of course these are the citizens who are more likely to feel marginalized by the existing

winner-take-all system. In particular, those who believe they have little or no say in the political process are more likely to prefer a system that produces proportional results. Ideology emerges though as a major factor, with liberals being much more likely to support the concept of proportionality.

While strategic considerations about how the vote may influence the outcome of the presidential election do not appear to have had an influence, partisan differences do emerge even after taking into account attitudes about proportionality. Republicans were more likely to oppose the measure while Democrats and independents were more supportive. In part, this is likely to result from the fact that prominent leaders in the Republican party, including the current governor, were opposed to the measure. This is not surprising given the fact that the Republican party, which has an advantage in statewide elections, stood the most to lose from replacing the winner-take-all system with PR. Had the measure been on the ballot in a state where the political landscape favors the Democratic party, such as in California, it is quite likely that political elites would have taken a different position.

From a broader perspective, the results from this case indicate that voters have the capacity to reason about complex issues. Many voters may well have had difficulty in understanding how the Electoral College works. Moreover, they had no experience with any alternative to the winner-take-all system. Nonetheless, the results suggest that voters did not reject the proposal because they failed to understand how it would work. Rather voters who voted against the measure did so because they either opposed the idea of dividing votes on a proportional basis or they feared that the change in rules would undermine their party's future success.

Appendix: Question Wording

Vote Choice

As you may know, this proposal would change the way Colorado awards its electoral votes in presidential elections. Currently, all of the electoral votes are awarded to the candidate who

wins the election statewide. Under this new proposal, the electoral votes would be divided proportionately according to how much support each candidate gets. If the election were held today, would you vote for or against this proposal?

Proportionality

Imagine that a presidential candidate receives 20 percent of the popular vote nationwide but fails to win a single state. Do you think that candidate *should* receive 20 percent of the votes in the Electoral College, some electoral votes, or no electoral votes at all?

Expectations

Thinking about the presidential election, regardless of how you may feel, who do you think will ultimately be elected president in November-- [RANDOMIZED BUSH & KERRY] or do you think it is just too close to call? And what about Colorado? Regardless of how you may feel, who do you think will win the most votes in Colorado? Would you say [RANDOMIZED BUSH & KERRY] or do you think it is just too close to call?

Awareness of Elite Opposition

Do you happen to know whether leaders in the Republican Party have supported or opposed Amendment 36? Do you happen to know whether leaders in the Democratic Party have supported or opposed Amendment 36?

Ideology

When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as very liberal, liberal, middle of the road, conservative, or very conservative?

Perceptions of Loss

Think of the presidential elections held in your lifetime. Do you think that the presidential candidates you support usually win, sometimes win, sometimes lose, or usually lose?

Political Attitudes

How much do you feel that having elections makes the government pay attention to what people think? Do you think having elections makes government pay attention a good deal, some, or not much?

My vote counts in elections

People like me don't have any say about what the government does

Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in the United States?

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Table 1: Hypotheses about Strategic Voting

<i>Vote Choice</i>	<i>Expectations</i>	<i>Decision</i>
Bush Voter	Bush will win Kerry will win Too close to call	Vote No Vote Yes Vote Yes
Kerry Voter	Bush will win Kerry will win Too close to call	Vote Yes Vote No Vote Yes

Table 2: Expectations about Presidential Election

	Expected Winner of Presidential Election			
	Republican	Democrat	Independent	Total
George W. Bush	60.3	18.8	31.1	38.9
John Kerry	2.9	34.6	22.0	17.4
Too close to call	33.9	42.9	42.4	39.9

	Expected Winner in Colorado			
	Republican	Democrat	Independent	Total
George W. Bush	73.6	46.6	53.0	57.8
John Kerry	4.0	19.5	18.2	12.9
Too close to call	21.3	30.1	21.2	25.0

Table 3: Political Attitudes in Colorado

	Republican	Democrat	Independent	Total
Satisfied with democracy	91.3	65.4	67.2	76.9
Vote counts in elections	97.7	83.3	83.3	89.2
People like me have no say (disagree)	81.6	60.2	65.6	70.6
Elections makes government pay attention a good deal	59.2	36.8	29.5	42.9
2000 election was fair	85.6	10.5	45.0	51.5

Table 4: Strategy and Vote Choice

<i>Presidential Choice</i>	<i>Expected winner</i>	<i>Yes Vote</i>
Bush voter	George Bush	18.5
Bush voter	John Kerry	33.3
Kerry voter	John Kerry	66.7
Kerry voter	George Bush	65.1
Bush voter	Too close to call	25.5
Kerry voter	Too close to call	64.8

Table 5: Attitudes about Proportionality

	Deserves nothing	Deserves some	Deserves 20%
Democrat	21.1	31.6	36.1
Independent	22.1	30.5	32.8
Republican	47.1	18.4	23.0
Liberal	12.7	31.8	46.4
Moderate	25.8	30.8	30.8
Conservative	50.0	18.6	19.1
Men	44.8	18.5	28.0
Women	19.6	32.9	30.1
Usually win	43.3	19.2	22.5
Sometimes win	29.2	28.8	33.3
Sometimes lose	33.3	33.3	15.2
Usually lose	20.0	26.7	43.3
Total	32.3	25.5	29.3

Table 6: Probability of Preferring Proportional Outcomes

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>
Ideology	.52	.12
No say in what government does	.21	.35
Gender	.21	.30

Figure 1: Impact of Proportionality on Vote Choice





Figure 2: Impact of Elite Opposition on Vote Choice



Appendix Table 1: Estimating Support for Amendment 36: Two Stage Logit Model

	First Stage Proportionality		Second Stage Vote			Second Stage Vote		
	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Std. Error</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Std. Error</u>	<u>Estimate</u>	<u>Std. Error</u>		
Vote does not count	-0.05	(0.15)						
Ideology	-0.54 **	(0.11)						
No say	0.25 *	(0.13)						
Dissatisfaction with democracy	0.10	(0.12)						
Republican	-0.25	(0.22)	-1.02 **	(0.26)	-0.61 *	(0.30)		
Democrat	-0.13	(0.18)	0.28	(0.22)	0.15	(0.25)		
Education	0.01	(0.09)	-0.08	(0.10)	-0.04	(0.10)		
Age	0.00	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)	-0.01	(0.01)		
Female	0.47 *	(0.18)	-0.12	(0.23)	-0.13	(0.24)		
Non white	0.22	(0.22)	0.36	(0.28)	0.44	(0.28)		
Proportionality			1.00 **	(0.20)	0.87 **	(0.20)		
Republicans oppose					0.46	(0.31)		
Republicans oppose x Republican					-2.37 **	(0.84)		
Democrats oppose					-1.30 *	(0.51)		
Democrats oppose x Democrat					0.81	(0.60)		
Constant 1	-1.74 ***	(0.73)	-1.87 **	0.65	-1.65 *	(0.67)		
Constant 2	0.14	(0.72)						
Nagelkerke R^2	0.16		0.27		0.32			
n	447		447		447			

**p<.01; *p<.05;